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Iam sure that some ofyou are thinking that only
a philosopher would dare select a title so compre-
hensive, and even vague, as one "CnScience and Philo-
sophy." You are probably wondering whether or not
there can be anything definite concerning a topic
this broad. Like you,Ihope that Ishall have some-
thing more specific to say than the title might indi-
cate. As a matter of fact, Ihad more specific
titles, some fancy, some plain, but none quite ap-
propriate. Finally Igave up on titles, trusting
that if you were not driven away by the present one,
you would be pleased to find any specificity whatso-
ever, and the title would then be forgotton, or at
least forgiven.
My theme, then, is this: That the objectives of
scientific inquiry in itls best sense and of philo-
sophic inquiry inits best sense are inmany respects
identical; that in the intellectual history of Wes-
tern civilization the union of scientific and philo-
sophic inquiry has often provided its most fruitful
moments; and that separation of scientific inquiry
and philosophic inquiry (a separation which in our
day seems ever more acute) is perilous to both.
The initial step inexploring this theme consists
in making as precise as possible the meaning of the
expressions "scientific inquiry in its best sense"
and "philosophic inquiry in its best sense." This
step might be put somewhat more loosely as defini-
tions of "science" and "philosophy." The step is
y A paper read at a general meeting of the Arkansas
Academy of Science at the University of Arkan-
sas, April 23, 1954.
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not an easy one to take. "Why not?" you ask, "For
surely every scientist knows what 'science 1 means
and every philosopher knows, or should know, what
'philosophy' means." Let me illustrate what Imean
by the difficultyof definition here, beginning with
not even a definition of science in general, but one
branch of science, physics. The definition is taken
from a well-known textbook. (3) "Physics deals with
the properties and phenomena of inanimate matter as
affected by forces, and is especially concerned with
the properties common to all kinds of matter and
those changes of form and state which matter under-
goes without being changed in kind, as well as such
general phenomena as sound, heat, electricity, and
magnetism." Now the definition may be technically
sound, but it is pedagogically absurd. How many be-
ginning students, for example, could do anything more
than parrot the words? The student should find this
definition meaningful at the close of the course,
but hardly at the beginning. Icite this definition
to point to a difficulty,not only for exploring the
theme Ihave chosen, but also in a larger sense for
communication among scientists and between scientists
and laymen. We are immersed indisparate disciplines
which become ever more technical. How do we tell
the outsider what we are up to? Isn't this the way
the questions come: "You are a mathematician, now
what ±s_ mathematics?" "So you are a nuclear physi-
cist. Fine, just what is nuclear physics all about?"
And so it goes. And what do we answer? We give the
kind of definition of "physics" above. Ihave done
itmany times for philosophy, myself. We have some-
thing pat, highly abstract, and generally meaning-
less to someone outside the field.
Ihope you willbear with me a little more on
this problem, for its implications for mutual under-
standing are important. Let me now take a definition
of "science" from a respectable book on logic and
scientific method by Cohen and Nagel. "We reserve
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the term 'science' for knowledge which is , general
and systematic, that is, in which specific propo-
sitions are all deduced from a few general princi-
ples. "(1) At first blush this definition seems clear
enough and perhaps adequate insofar as such brevity-
can ever be adequate for extensive disciplines such
as the sciences. But a little reflection presents
certain stumbling blocks. By this definition St.
Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica is science. The
knowledge there noted is general and systematic. He
deduces specific propositions, even to the adornment
of women and the economics of the market place, from
general principles. Yet today, a certain uneasiness
develops when a definition of "science" embraces at
once, without qualification, Thomas' Summa and New-
ton's Principia. Such a definition would seem to
slur over important distinctions between the two
works, and Idoubt that Iam alone in suspecting that
the definition requires some clarification.
We are back where wa started without a definition.
It would be easy, but unprofitable here, to supply
other definitions presenting difficulties. In view
of .such difficulties we might ask after the tremen-
dous burst of scientific investigation over the past
300 years providing a vast store of knowledge, why
is it so troublesome to state simply and clearly
what science is? Isuggest that one reason is this
very growth of a considerable variety of sciences
and that these sciences in turn are in varying stages
of development. Physics is much older than sociology
and possesses a precision which the latter cannot
begin to approximate at the moment. Is it then pos-
sible to find a common core to the sciences such that
the term "science" can be used in any meaningful way
at all? With some recent writers the attempt is
abandoned altogether to the extent that even the ex-
pression "scientific method" is considered naive.
The new locution should rather be "scientific methods."
Before we too quickly accept this latest fad, I
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shall be old-fashioned enough to suggest that it is
still meaningful to speak of scientific method, and
that if it is meaningful to speak of scientific
method then the word "science" has significance at
least in terms of a basic unity of method. Today no
one, of course, willdeny that the various sciences
need instruments, techniques, and theoretical con-
structs appropriate to their particular problems.
Clearly one of the retarding factors in the develop-
ment of the social sciences was an almost blind aping
of physics in the 17th and 18th centuries, especially
as to approach and types of theory construction. The
ideal in the social sciences was the achievement of
a kind of social physics. In more than one writer,
man was conceived as a social atom, motivated by
various imputed forces
— pure selfishness, enligh-
tened self-interest, a social sympathy, or one of
these in common with reason, and so on, in much the
same way as physical atoms moved in terms of the law
of gravitation and the invariant laws of motion.
Fortunately this unhappy mimicry of physics has been
transcended. But if it has been transcended, does
this mean that there is nothing in common between,
say, physics and sociology?
Isuggest that there are present in all scien-
tific investigations certain factors o r traits of
sufficient importance to warrant our speaking of a
common scientific method. What then are these com-
mon factors? Ishall list them in one, two, three
fashion, but Ido not mean that they are so many
serial steps followed in every inquiry. They are
rather common traits. 2/
1. A problematic situation. The origin of scien-
tific inquiry is in problematic situations, situations
of indeterminacy, perplexity, doubt. It is these
=/ My indebtedness to methodological analyses of John
Dewey will be obvious.
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which generate investigations. The investigator who
has no doubts, no questions, no perplexities, liter-
ally ceases to investigate. Inquiry is at an end.
On the other hand, the seminal mind in a science is
the mind that in a sense flourishes on doubt, per-
plexities, questions leading to the formulation of
new problems. One of the prominent characteristics
that distinguishes science from religion, as religion
is frequently conceived, is precisely this search
for novelty in contrast witha passion for certainty.
There is, furthermore, a close relationship between
the determination of problematic situations and a
habit of mind of the scientist. This habit is that
of holding his beliefs, even his most cherished and
confirmed beliefs in some degree of suspension.
Should this suspension become rigid, genuine inquiry
ceases.
2. The careful formulation of a definite problem
out of the problematic situation. This factor con-
sists ofprocedures utilized to transform an initially
perplexing, doubtful, indeterminate situation into
one of greater precision. The techniques are numer-
ous and usually include such matters as the examina-
tion of procedures and the results of investigations
in allied problems and the search for significant
as opposed to irrelevant elements in the situation
under investigation.
3. The formulation of possible solutions to the
roblem or, inmore sophisticated language, the de-
velopment of hypotheses. The search may be brief or
lengthy. The first proposal may be successful, or
many alternatives may fail in the tests. All this
is familiar. It is this element inthe process which
is perhaps the focal point of the creative activity
of scientific inquiry. It is also here that the more
systematic a science becomes, the more the symbolic
formulation of hypotheses tends to be mathematical.
4. The testing of the hypotheses. From the 17th
century to the present day the insistence has been
128
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upon some sort of experimental situation for the
testing or confirmation of hypotheses. If this ex-
periential situation can be experimental, the actual
manipulation of the conditions of the problem, so
much the better. With the development of the experi-
mental sciences, the testing is increasingly a func-
tion of instrumentation. In an important way the
history of modern science is a function of the his-
tory of instrumentation. In 1925 Whitehead commen-
ted: "The reason why we are on a higher imaginative
level than earlier scientists is not because we have
finer imagination, but because we have better in-
struments. In science, the most important thing that
has happened during the last forty years is the ad-
vance in instrumental design. "(10)
5. The systematic development of the logical con-
sequences of hypotheses. Sometimes an hypothesis is
not directly testable; hence logical consequences
are deduced, usually mathematically, for the purpose
of finding testable situations. Thus Galileo could
not test directly his hypothesis that the accelera-
tion of a freely falling body was proportional to
the time of the fall. A logical consequence is that
the distance of the fallis proportional to the square
of the times. This proposition could be experimen-
tally confirmed. The situation was, of course, his
classic inclined-plane experiment. Again, if an hy-
pothesis is confirmed in one instance, what other
consequences can be developed to be tested? As the
confirming tests increase, confidence in the adequacy
of the hypothesis grows.
Again, the five factors just described may, or
may not, occur in the order named. The formulation
of a definite problem, the formulation of hypotheses,
the testing, the development of logical consequences
interpenetrate one another in the actual reflection
of the scientist as he goes about his work. But
these factors can be discerned in the analysis of
inquiry called scientific and constitute basic dis-
tinguishing traits of that inquiry.
129
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The end results of inquiry as here described yield
statements about "Comparative Effects of Total Body
and Tail Heating on the Peripheral Leukocyte Count
of the Rat," (7) or "The Effects of Wind-Drift of
Ueed- Killer or Some Puerto Rican Trees," (8) or "A
New Dense Crystalline Silica,"(9) or inother words,
that vast store of experientially verified proposi-
tions or the so-called factual information about the
physical, biological, and social world.
But scientific inquiry also yields statements of
a higher degree of generality than those just noted;
e.g., Galileo's Law ofFalling Bodies, Boyle's Law of
Gases, Ohm's Law, and the like. (Irealize the term
"law"is subject to criticism in contemporary method-
ological analyses. Imerely mention these hypotheses
as they are usually referred to in the literature.)
Their greater generality comes inpart from the large,
perhaps indefinite,number of phenomena falling with-
in the law.
Noting this matter of generality, we turn now to
a sixth trait or element in scientific inquiry: The
search for system and sometimes its achievement in
terms of a relatively few abstract hypotheses from
which propositions of less generality are deduced.
This is that aspect of science referred to previousD.y
as Cohen and Nagel's definition of "science." To
call it the meaning or the nature of science seems
narrow, since this trait obviously is not present in
every scientific investigation. It is more aptly
called the ideal of science. A clue to this factor
as an ideal is that such systematization is found
only in the so-called advanced sciences. As a mat-
ter of fact,Isuspect "advanced science" and "achieve-
ment of systemat; zation" are equivalent expressions.
In the early nistory of modern science the illustra-
tion which leaps to mind of this sort of ideal of
science is Newton's Principia. There the of
investigrtions in certain branches of physics and
of astronomy from Copernicus to Newton over a period
130
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of 144 years received the consummate systematization.
Because of this achievement Newton's name became in
the 17th to the end of the 19th century virtually
synonymous with science. It is this same sort of
achievement of even a higher order of generality that
in our own day Einstein has accomplished, Iam told.
(Ihave to add the "I am told" forIdo not have the
technical equipment to understand the mathematics of
what he has accomplished.) Ishould like to read a
fairly lengthy quotation from Einstein on precisely
this matter of generality:
Among the various pictures of the world
which are formed by the artist and the philos-
opher and the poet, what place does the world-
picture o f the theoretical physicist occupy?
Its chief quality must be scrupulous correct-
ness and internal logical coherence, which only
the language of mathematics can express. On
the other hand, the physicist has to be severe
and self-denying in regard to the material he
uses. He has to be content with reproducing
the most simple processes that are open to our
sensory experience, because the more complex
processes cannot be represented by the human
mind with the subtle exactness and logical se-
quence which are indispensable for the theo-
retical physicist.
Even at the expense of completeness, we have
to secure purity, clarity, and accurate cor-
respondence between the representation and the
thing represented. When one realizes how small
a part of nature can thus be comprehended and
expressed in an exact formulation, while all
that is subtle and complex has to be excluded,
it is only natural to ask, what sort of at-
traction this work can have? Does the result
of such self-denying selection deserve the
high-sounding name of World-Picture?
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Ithink it does; because the most general
laws on which the thought -structure of theo-
retical physics is built have to be taken into
consideration in studying even the simplest
events in nature. If they were fully known
one ought to be able to deduce from them by
means of purely abstract reasoning the theory
of every process of nature, including that of
life itself. Imean theoretically, because in
practice such a process of deduction is en-
tirely beyond the capacity of human reasoning.
Therefore the fact that in science we have to
be content with an incomplete picture of the
physical universe is not due to the nature of
the universe itself but rather to us.
Thus the supreme task of the physicist is
the discovery of the most general elementary
laws from which the world-picture can be de-
duced logically... In every important advance
the physicist finds that the fundamental laws
are simplified more and more a s experimental
research advances. He is astonished to notice
how sublime order emerges from what appeared
to be chaos. (5)
This ultimate search for comprehensive order is what
Ireferred to in my theme as "the objective of scien-
tific inquiry in its best sense."
But now what are we going to do with philosophy
in this paper? Ihave struggled so long in trying
to point to what seems to me to be the common ele-
ments of scientific inquiry that little time is left
for philosophy. Iam sure that any one of you, the
practicing scientist, could have made wonderfully
clear in one-half or one-fourth the time just what
the essence of science is. Isuspect that since Iam
a practicing philosopher you expect me with similar
dispatch to make wonderfully clear precisely what
philosophy is. And it is here that Iam embarrassed,
132
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for Imust confess Ido not find it easy to state
briefly the nature of philosophy. Oh, it is easy
enough to toss off the pat definitions to which I
referred earlier. Philosophy is the love of wisdom.
Philosophy is seeing life steadily and seeing it
whole. But these vignettes require a world of elabo-
ration, and thus we are back to our old difficulty.
Ican make quite clear, quite briefly, what I
think philosophy is not. Philosophy is not a system
of static beliefs. A man willoften ask his neighbor,
"Well, just what is your philosophy of life?" Mean-
ing frequently, what is that system o f last-stand
beliefs to which you willhold no matter what. In
this sense philosophy becomes identical with some
people's view of religion as a set of ultimate, un-
challengeable beliefs. Philosophy may be
—
in fact,
it is in some of its branches --concerned with last-
stand beliefs, but it is not concerned with them in
this manner. For philosophy is preeminently a quest,
an inquiry.
What then is the nature of this quest? The best
answer to this question is the study of the history
of philosophy. Since such a proper study would be
out of the question in so short a time as five or
ten minutes, Ishall have to indicate what my own
study finds characteristic of its history. Ithink
philosophy in its best moments is a quest, an in-
quiry working toward a critical, systematic, and com-
prehensive view of man's experience. Now "experi-
ence," as William James pointed out, is a double-
barreled word. It means both the objects of experi-
ence and the way we experience them. Iuse "experi-
ence" here in this double-barreled sense. Quite
obviously the objects of our experience are the total-
ity of what we do experience: the natural world
around us, the totality of culture with its complex
institutional framework, and our own internal experi-
ence. "Incredible," you say, "that any man should
dare to embrace so much." Incredible itmay be, but
133
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a few have so dared, and Ithink their daring has
been profitable for mankind. Very early in its his-
tory certain types of questions emerged as the most
persistent in this quest; questions which have promp-
ted the development of, broadly speaking, three major
areas of philosophic inquiry: (a) Questions about
nature, producing metaphysics, the study of the most
pervasive characteristics of nature; ©.•£•> space,
time, and causality, and cosmology or theories of
the development of the universe; (b) questions about
knowledge, which have led to studies, in the language
of Locke, of "the origin, certainty, and extent of
human knowledge," and to logic, the analysis of the
weight of evidence for our belief s;and (c) questions
about values or what men consider worthwhile, leading
to ethics, the analysis of religious experience, and
to theories of art. The effort in the greatest of
the philosophers has been just this: In these fields
to examine critically the foundations of each, to at-
tempt some systematic treatment within each, and to
undertake some comprehensive, systematic view of the
relations among these fields. Itis this sort of
enterprise that in its history the greatest of the
philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, and
Kant, or on the contemporary scene, Whitehead, Rus-
sell, Santayana, and Dewey undertook. This is phil-
osophy in its best sense.
What, then, has this conception of philosophy to
do with the theme of this paper? If Ihave inter-
preted correctly the objectives ofscience and phil-
osophy in their best senses, it should be clear that
they are identical in the search for comprehensive
order within man's experience. The physical scien-
tist takes a portion of that experience; e_.£., the
physical world, and in this selection his objective
is more restricted. The philosopher undertakes to
understand the unity there achieved and to relate it
to other types of experience: biological, social,
moral, religious, aesthetic. What the physical sci-
134
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entist achieves has always, and will always, influ-
ence profoundly the nature of the unity achieved by
the philosopher, for the exploration of the relation
between man and nature is one of the crucial philo-
sophic problems. Every philosopher worth his salt
has always tried to understand and appropriate the
best available knowledge of the natural worldof his
day. Ican see no other road for a genuine philoso-
phy.
From what Ihave just said, the idea might arise
that there is but a one-way path from science to
philosophy; that is, the scientist provides compre-
hensive unities which the philosopher employs, but
the philosopher has nothing to offer in return. I
do not think this is the case. Actually Ihave made
a second claim in my theme
—
that in the intellec-
tual history o f Western civilization the union of
scientific and philosophic inquiry has often provi-
ded its most fruitful moments. Ibelieve this con-
tention can be documented abundantly, but Ishall
illustrate briefly only from ancient Greece and the
17th century.
It was in ancient Greece that the enterprises of
philosophy and science, as we have come to know them,
were born; born, one might say, as twins. The his-
tory of Western philosophy began about 600 B.C. with
a group o f Greek philosophers who wrote "about Na-
ture." What is it they sought? They sought to un-
derstand the material basis of the universe and the
energizing forces that are responsible for the cease-
less change that takes place. Here was formulated
at least the clear notion of a universe, the idea of
a comprehensive order. The theories were naive, but
this idea is not naive, and within two-hundred years
Domecritus stated the not so naive theory that the
universe consists only of atoms in motion governed
by inexorable laws. Iam sure that Democritus would
have felt very much at home in1687, the year Newton's
Principia was published.
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A second extravagant speculation, but of the most
profound importance for the entire history of science,
was the Fythagorean notion that number is the key-
to nature. The Pythagoreans were bewitched by their
controlling idea and readily generated a numerical
magic, but their faith that nature is through and
through a mathematical order was to work later a
kind of magic inmodern science. Plato readily adop-
ted the notion and made ita cardinal element in his
theory of knowledge and theory of nature. It was
this Plato, poet mathematician, philosopher, who was
to contribute to the birth of modern science by be-
inga factor in the transmission of this mathematical
faith. In the Italian Renaissance, there was a strong
revival of Platonism, and through it impetus was given
to the search for mathematical relationships in na-
ture. Galileo himself says:
Here /in his collected works/ willbe per-
ceived from innumerable examples what is the
use of mathematics for judgment in the natural
sciences and how impossible it is to philoso-
phize correctly without the guidance of Geome-
try, as the wise maxim of Plato has it True
philosophy expounds nature to us; but she can
be understood only by him who has learned the
speech and symbols in which she speaks to us.
This speech is mathematics, and its symbols
are mathematical figures. Philosophy is writ-
ten in this greatest book, which continually
stands open here to the eyes of all, but can-
not be understood unless one first learns the
language and characters in which it is writ-
ten. This language is mathematics, and the
characters are triangles, circles, and other
mathematical figures." (6)
A third illustration of the intimate tie between
science and philosophy in their early years was a
136
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possibility of both. It was the Greek philosophers
who discovered discourse, and Aristotle more than
any other at that time who systematized this discov-
ery. What does the discovery of discourse mean? It
was the Greeks who found that the pushes and pulls
of nature could be transmuted into discourse which
then has meaning in terms o f the actual events out
of which the discourse is generated. It is dis-
course, statements, propositions, which are seen to
have meaning and to be true or false. Events are not
true or false. And it is our statements and propo-
sitions a s they are systematized and tested which
constitute the heart of science. This the Greeks
clearly saw, a discovery which Dewey calls the great-
est single discovery of man. Logos, the word, dis-
course, is then itself made an object of study to
provide us with logic, and within this general study
the first careful treatment of the idea of science
as system is found in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.
Ishall turn to only one more example in classical
Greece of the tie between philosophy and science.
Aristotle, Isuppose, is the best example at that
time of scientist and philosopher. Few people, some-
times even in philosophy, seem to realize that Aris-
totle wrote on biology more than on any other subject
matter. Historians of science are wont to call him
the father of biology. No less a biologist than Lar-
win commented, "Cuvier and Linnaeus have been my two
gods, though in very different ways, but they were
mere schoolboys to old Aristotle. "(2) But we can
not pause to examine why these encomia are made.
One of the rare occasions when Aristotle, the dis-
passionate writer, shows any sign of emotion is in
a passage at the close of the first book of a work,
On the Parts of Animals, in which he eloquently urges
the study of animal and plant life. The influence
of Aristotle's work in biology upon his total philos-
ophy was profound. Itpermeates, for example, his
1¦i-J I 137
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ethics, one of the finest statements ofa naturalis-
tic ethic that has ever been written. Man is a per-
fectly natural, not a supernatural creature, Aristotle
argues. In terms of this natural basis and the fact
that he possesses intelligence to a higher degree
than the other animals, what is the good life for man?
Those who pursue science as a naturalistic undertak-
ing, but put man in a separate non-natural category
for his moral behavior, would do well to read this
challenge to their supernaturalistic assumptions.
Well, Ihave come here not to praise the Greeks,
but to illustrate the virtual union o f science and
philosophy, as they were born in Western culture.
The union persisted in the social sciences until re-
cent date and still does in some respects down to
the present. It continued with the physical scien-
ces Ithink at least until Newton. Galileo fought
with more than one philosophy professor of his day,
usually to the discredit of the philosophy professor,
but Ithink the argument was not about science as
against philosophy, but what was correct in philos-
ophy. It seems he argues in this way: Does not
philosophy have something to do with the advancement
of knowledge? Scholastic philosophy has become ster-
ile in its blind obedience to authority. Correct
philosophy is to be found in getting on with the
study of nature, a view, interestingly enough, that
Aristotle pushed hard in the first book ofhis Meta-
physics.
The union between the scientist and the philoso-
pher in the 17th century was often so close as to be
virtually indistinguishable. Descartes, you will
remember, invented analytical geometry. He saw this
invention as an illustration of a new method of phil-
osophizing which he would apply to all of man's ex-
perience. This method is described in his Discourse
on Method and is further illustrated in his Principles
of Philosophy, a work on a theory of nature. His
mathematical discovery he did not see as something
138
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separate from his philosophizing. Galileo was never
more critical of scholastic philosophy than Descartes;
yet curiously enough there is the common notion that
Galileo fits into the history of science and not
philosophy whereas Descartes fits into the history
of philosophy and not, or only secondarily, in sci-
ence. Isuspect they both belong in both streams.
Descartes
'
most speculative hypothesis was his mech-
anical view of nature. This is, of course, a revival
of the Democratean view: Nature is composed only of
matter in motion, operating in terms of invariant
laws. This is the view that has given Descartes'
name to what some historians call the Cartesian Revo-
lution. The history of modern science until the lat-
ter part of the l°th century seemed documentary proof
of the hypothesis. It was Newton, of course, who
provided evidence for this view in a way that Des-
cartes never accomplished.
Newton's work is so frequently referred to by a
single word of its title, Principia, Isometimes
think that, ifnot the title, then certainly the sig-
nificance, has been forgotten. You will recall it,
Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica; i,.£.,
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. What
did Newton mean by this title? Perhaps it was an
accident. Perhaps Newton didn't really know what he
meant. Or perhaps itmeans what it says, that he is
dealing with the mathematical principles of natural
philosophy, or as he himself says in his introduc-
tion, "Ihave in this treatise cultivated mathematics
as far as it relates to philosophy." (4) What the
early Greek philosophers had dreamed about ,a theory
of nature which would make intelligible the great
ebb and flow of things in nature, is now realized in
a language they could not yet know, a highly developed
mathematics, and with evidence that required the pa-
tient observation of numerous individuals. A general
theory of nature; yes, a science of nature had now
been achieved. What remains is primarily the com-
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pletion of the details, an undertaking which seems
to have been the primary occupation of the energies
of physical scientists during the 18th and well in-
to the 19th century untilnew evidence within physics
required reexamination of the basis of the Newtonian
Theory. You willnote this reexamination and refor-
mulation came from no promptings and virtually no
help from within the philosophic fraternity.
"Why is this so? The reasons probably are numer-
ous, but one clearly is a product of the 19th cen-
tury. If the 19th century did not invent, at least
it fostered, specialization of inquiry ina way never
known before. The advancement of knowledge turned
into a kind of assembly-line process. The results
have been both a blessing and a curse. Items, one
might almost say atoms ofknowledge have proliferated
at an unbelievable rate. But high specialization
has fostered an insularity such that one social scien-
tist can hardly talk to another of different breed,
let alone to a physical scientist. Except in physi-
cal theory, the systematic organization of large
areas of experience seems not only to lag, but even
to be shunned. The same trend has operated in phil-
osophy. The men in 20th century philosophy Imen-
tioned earlier are all dead except Russell; and he
has passed, Isuppose, the peak of his imaginative
production. Where are the young men in philosophy
who dare to see man's experience steadily and wholly?
They haven't spoken yet. For one thing, Ican see
no adequate philosophy without an adequate theory of
nature, and it is a plain fact that most philosophers
today do not know enough about contemporary physical
theory. Ishould be the first to confess this igno-
rance. On the other hand an adequate theory of na-
ture is not an adequate philosophy of life because,
fortunately or unfortunately, man is a moral and
aesthetic creature besides a thinking creature. The
spectacle of certain scientists who have suddenly
become excited about the consequences o f the atom
140
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bomb and turned moral philosophers, has not been an
encouraging one. The world did not have to wait for
the atom bomb to raise the question of the relation
between man's knowledge and his moral beliefs. The
question has been explored and clarified over a per-
iod of twenty-five-hundred years in Western philos-
ophy. Why not be aware of and use that analysis?
What then would seem to be the lesson in this pre-
dicament? Ihave tried to show that the objectives
of scientific inquiry in its best sense and of phil-
osophy in its best sense have much in common; that
in the intellectual history o f the West the inter-
penetration of science and philosophy has provided
some of its most fruitful moments. Would not the
lesson seem to be that somehow, as scientists and
philosophers, we must disenthrall ourselves? That
somehow we must rise above our specialties for the
enhancement and enlargement of one another's minds
in the pursuit of what seems to be a common objec-
tive
—
to understand nature and man's place in it.
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